Abstract: Building on Erving Goffman's discussion of stigma, this essay explores how stigma and normalcy produce each other. Stigmatizing includes processes of recognition, misrecognition, estrangement, and othering. We consider how the stigmatized vernacular produces and deploys visibility, invisibility, and hypervisibility of cultural practices. Examining the experiences of political asylum seekers, we suggest that routinized violence produces a new kind of ordinary for victims of persecution; when these stigmatized individuals seek refuge in a new country, officials sometimes further stigmatize them by insisting on their own categories of 'normal.' We argue that any assessment of cultural context that depends on cultural norms is insufficient for understanding stigmatizing situations: conceptualizing 'the normal' is itself a means for enacting exclusions, and the stigmatized vernacular can be a pervasive mechanism for concealing discrimination under the guise of what is 'normal.' We propose that studying the stigmatized vernacular can serve as a critique of the veneration of the folk in folkloristic research.
Stigm a is a fundamental concept for folkloristics, first as a dimension of 'the folk' as other, subaltern, or minority-a status not always accompanied by stigma-and second as a dimension of how those groups manage their identities and negotiate recognition. Folklorists have a long history of wrestling with the complexities of sympathetic representations of stigmatized groups. Folklorists have an implicit mandate to avoid ethnocentric judgment, a long heritage of championing social justice, and a history of ongoing dialogue about what to do when placed in the uncomfortable position of describing politically or socially less acceptable cultural practices. Sometimes, folklorists have been in the position of collaborating with members of a group in order to recuperate or identify the group's positive value, whether as explicit advocates or as crafters of sympathetic representations.
Study of the stigmatized vernacular-that is, attending to how particular practices of everyday life are marked and repudiated-contributes to existing related discussions, including those that treat ethnocentrism, cultural relativism, discrimination, stereotyping, and identity politics. We suggest that the concept of the stigmatized vernacular additionally calls attention to how stigma relies upon the stability of what counts as normal. In this essay, we explore how stigma and normalcy produce each other; in addition, we consider the experiences of individuals whose normal, ordinary, familiar worlds have radically changed or disappeared as a result of political violence. Folklorists are familiar with the fact that cultural conventions regarding what is ordinary and familiar always change. We add to that discussion by considering the disappearance of the ordinary, or more precisely, the experience of routinized violence as a different kind of ordinary for people who then seek asylum in a new country. We observe how immigration officials in political asylum hearings sometimes further stigmatize victims of persecution by insisting on their own categories of 'normal.' After a general discussion of the stigmatized vernacular and folklore, we will turn to an in-depth account of political asylum and stigma, represented through a description of a Cameroonian woman's asylum case.
Initially, we approached the study of political asylum with the observation that in some cases, immigration officials' rejections of applicants revealed a lack of understanding of cultural context. However, after reviewing dozens of cases of what looked like absurd denials, we decided to pay more attention to what we came to call the 'lens of suspicion' through which asylum officers typically evaluate cases. We propose that attention to the cultural context of the asylum applicants is insufficient for determining the legitimacy of their claims. More generally, any assessment of cultural context that depends on cultural norms is insufficient for understanding stigmatizing situations. Conceptualizing 'the normal' is itself a means for enacting exclusions. In the case of political asylum hearings, if a cultural practice or situation is not recognized as falling within what the officials are willing to accept as plausible, the application will fail. In our work with asylum seekers, we have documented several cases in which culturally specific experiences of violence and persecution did not conform to the officials' expectations and presumptions. At the same time, we recognize that taking cultural context into account is insufficient for understanding how norms are imposed and sustained. Violence can become routinized, creating regimes of exclusion that appear to be 'normal.' For example, asylum officials have denied applications by lesbians requesting political asylum, arguing that they should return to their home countries and act "discreetly" in order to avoid persecution. The stigmatized vernacular can be a pervasive mechanism for concealing discrimination under the guise of what is 'normal. ' In this essay we discuss stigmatizing practices in the context of a politics of visibility and tellability: we consider how stigma can render groups visible/invisible/hypervisible and can render their stories untellable. In other words, stigma is part of larger processes of recognition, misrecognition, estrangement, and othering. Our research focuses on political asylum applicants who have experienced stigma, discrimination, and persecution in their home countries and who often face further stigma when their political asylum claims are labeled fraudulent by asylum officials. In many cases, applicants for political asylum not only have been disqualified for normal, ordinary categories of social life in their home countries, but the extreme consequences of stigma as discrimination and persecution have also destroyed whatever was once familiar to them.
Finally, we suggest some disciplinary applications. Conceptualizing the stigmatized vernacular involves describing how what might otherwise be normal or ordinary situations and experiences become defamiliarized, estranged, marked as other. For folklorists, the study of the stigmatized vernacular is part of a tension between the repudiated and the celebrated. Carol Silverman's (2012) study of Romani music and culture begins by observing that many groups revere Romani music but discriminate against Romani people. The repudiated and the venerated rarely exist in isolation; rather, they are connected to each other through processes of valuation, devaluation, and revaluation. For folklorists, the stigmatized vernacular is part of the relations between forms and values that characterize all cultural practices: all forms of expressive culture-whether they be genres, material productions, or performances-always have value.
Thus folklorists, who recognize stigma as an unfortunately pervasive dimension of inter-group relations, have much to add to conversations about human rights, cultural relativism, normalcy, and abnormalcy. A folkloric approach to stigma would 1) attend to how stigma is associated with particular cultural constructions of normalcy by using ethnography to document what is considered normal/abnormal, by whom, about whom, and in which contexts; 2) observe the performative, interactional facets of stigma ('passing,' associating with fellow travelers, etc.) as both a dimension of social group networks and as a dimension of performance in everyday life; 3) provide a close analysis of both discourses and interactions to identify how stigma is enacted through different genres, including jokes, narratives, folk drama, etc.; 4) observe cultural expectations of the tellability and untellability of those genres in different contexts; and 5) attend to how stigmatized groups position themselves with regard to whatever is considered normal or ordinary as a part of belonging to a particular folk group.
Normalcy, the Ordinary, and Cultural Relativism One of the most valuable contributions of Erving Goffman's understanding of stigma was his observation that discrimination on the basis of perceived difference (physical, racial, cultural, etc.) excludes individuals from participation in whatever is considered normal (1963, 2) . That is, stigma and normalcy produce each other: stigmatization places a group outside the bounds of what is considered ordinary, acceptable, and expected by others; members of stigmatized groups are deprived of (Goffman says "disqualified" from) being normal. As Goffman points out, individuals sometimes take on the stigmas assigned to them by others. But many stigmatized individuals determine to be ordinary on their own terms, that is, without changing to conform to others' categories of what counts as normal. Further, when something otherwise ordinary is denied, it loses its status as given and can become instead a site of discrimination. The plea for redress can be an appeal for a restoration of the ordinary. For example, in his 2009 plenary address to the American Folklore Society-an account of how folklorists celebrate the ordinary-Roger Welsch told a story about arranging for a Native American group to bury the remains of their desecrated ancestors on his property. What the Native American group wanted was something very ordinary: burying their ancestors properly.
Most of the research on stigma following Goffman has focused on how people manage their "spoiled identities" (Goffman 1963 ) and on the consequences of stereotyping for self-esteem or social status, rather than on stigmatizing processes in cultural interaction. What is neglected in the majority of research on stigma is attention to what Goffman describes as "the normals" (1963, 5) or what Lennard Davis (1995 Davis ( , 2006 has described as normalcy, 1 and the ways that stigma and normalcy produce each other. Davis, a leading disabilities scholar, calls attention to normalcy as an ideological construct. As in anthropological discussions of cultural relativism (Herskovits 1972) , the critique of normalcy articulates a position of estrangement, a heightened awareness of the constructedness of the taken-for-granted world, and especially of the judgments implicit in identifying some experiences as 'normal.' 2 As Alison Dundes Renteln points out, cultural relativism is "not just the recognition of cultural differences in thought, value, and action. It is a theory about the way in which evaluations or judgments are made" (1988, 57) . Renteln specifically links the concept of cultural relativism to normalcy, referring in particular to Ruth Benedict's observations that normal and abnormal are culturally specific categories (58).
The concept of the stigmatized vernacular thus provides an opportunity to move beyond old arguments about the inadequacies of the concept of cultural relativism, especially with regard to the possible contradiction between cultural relativism and human rights (Dembour 1996; Khanna 2006) . Renteln argues that this is not a necessary contradiction because relativism does not imply tolerance (1988, 68) . As we will discuss, the political asylum process, a human rights endeavor, is a useful example of the problem that recognizing cultural difference does not inevitably lead to greater tolerance. In the example of the political asylum process we discuss here, more often asylum seekers are stigmatized for cultural differences that do not fit the mold of expectations for asylum.
Stigma, Estrangement, and Political Asylum
The authors have been working with political asylum applicants for more than a decade. Beginning in the 1990s Carol Bohmer, a sociologist and lawyer, volunteered her services at Community Refugee Immigration Services in Columbus, Ohio, and she has continued her work in New England and the United Kingdom. Amy Shuman, a folklorist, initially collaborated with Bohmer to identify problems of narrative faced by the asylum seekers. After co-publishing work on narrative and asylum (Bohmer and Shuman 2004) , we wrote a book designed to provide a comprehensive discussion of the problems asylum seekers experience with the immigration systems in the United States and the United Kingdom. That book, Rejecting Refugees (Bohmer and Shuman 2008) , was informed by both ethnographic and legal perspectives, but it was written without academic jargon: our intended audience was asylum seekers and those who assist them. Here, as in all of our publications, we have drawn upon already published cases (whether in print or online) rather than describe the individuals with whom we have worked. We are wary of subjecting these individuals or their families and associates to any jeopardy, and we are aware of how easily someone can be traced through us, even if we use pseudonyms and change places of origin. In some cases we have perceived more risk than our interlocutors did; for example, Margaretta, whose case we discuss here, requested that we write about her story.
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Political asylum applicants are multiply stigmatized in the immigration process. As we discuss at greater length in Rejecting Refugees, applicants from some countries are treated more favorably than others. Mothers can be stigmatized for leaving their children behind; applicants who enter the United States or United Kingdom with false documents or without documents are considered criminals. The applicants, having suffered catastrophic and violent loss of their everyday lives and cultural traditions, understandably describe out-of the-ordinary circumstances but face the task of convincing the officials that their stories are credible (Bloomaert 2001; Einhorn 2009; Jacquemet 1996; Ranger 2008; Schuster 2003) . Lacking many of the markers of credibility, such as proof of identity or documentation of what they suffered, these individuals rely on their narratives to prove that they are who they say they are and that the things they describe really happened (Bohmer and Shuman 2008) . As Goffman noted, the stigmatized are discredited; this certainly applies to the asylum seeker, though the result of being discredited has the extreme consequence of deportation.
Goffman conceptualizes stigma as a process of estrangement in which individuals discover that they are disqualified for whatever counts as normal (1963, 80) . The concept of estrangement-making the familiar strange-is fundamental to ethnography and has its roots in the politics of oppression, from the Russian Formalists' concept of estrangement in the novel (Herzfeld 2005) to Paulo Freire's argument (1974) that resisting oppression requires a process of externalization through which people who have been the objects of symbolic and physical violence begin by naming and reading the world.
Estrangement works in multiple directions. As in the case of stigma or stereotype, it can be a process of othering others as different and then differently valued, or a process of self-recognition of that othering, or alienation from a dominant ideological formation. In the narratives we discuss here, Margaretta, a Cameroonian political asylum applicant in the United States, describes how she was stigmatized in Cameroon because she spoke English, discrimination that resulted in her being deprived of her nursing certificate. She protested along with other students, was imprisoned, raped, and then faced further imprisonment in a prison from which, she said, no one ever left. She was able to escape, travel to the United States and apply for political asylum. Twice, her asylum application was denied: as is common in the political asylum application process, her case was considered insufficient, in large part because her story was not deemed credible. We will argue that the asylum seekers and the asylum officials operate with different vernaculars, different conceptions of what counts as normal, and that in the context of the political asylum hearing, that difference renders the asylum seekers' experiences untellable and renders them unrecognizable. 4 Of course, some applicants are successful, but we suggest that in both cases-those accepted and those denied-asylum seekers are subject to an asylum official's assumptions about what is credible.
For the past ten years, we have been collecting narratives from people applying for political asylum in the United States and United Kingdom.
5 These are people fleeing persecution more horrendous than stigma or discrimination-but as part of their experiences, they describe being made into outcasts. They describe not only the pain of stigmatization, but also their longing for an ordinary life that has been destroyed and that will not be recovered. The success of their applications depends on persuading immigration officials that they have a "well-founded fear" of returning home. In order to do this, they have to reconstruct life as they knew it and life as it became in conditions of persecution; they must also communicate the impossibility of returning to a home that in many cases no longer exists. The task of the immigration official is to determine whether or not return is possible: according to the international law of non-refoulement, people cannot be returned to a home country where they would face persecution or danger. 6 The asylum official thus needs to determine whether the applicant's story is credible and whether the home country is safe for that person. Both determinations depend on assessments of what is credible/normal/possible. Asylum officials determine credibility based on several factors, including the applicant's demeanor, whether or not the description of the persecution conforms to what the official knows about the situation in the applicant's home country, whether there are any inconsistencies in the application, whether the official has heard similar accounts and therefore considers the applicant's account to be a stock story, and whether the applicant has knowledge that the official would expect him or her to have about the home country, religion, or situation. For example, a female applicant claiming persecution on the grounds of maintaining a sexual relationship with another woman was asked about her knowledge of lesbian bars and magazines (Lewis 2012) . The link between the credible and the normal is one of the fault lines in the system. Each measure of credibility depends on the officials' expectations, prior knowledge, and assumptions. The category of the plausible is an extension of the category of the normal. However, an account of atrocities is never normal and therefore always somewhat incredible.
In Rejecting Refugees, we review each of these dimensions of credibility; here, we provide a discussion of one case at length in order to explore the complexities of the political asylum review process. Margaretta's credibility was challenged on two grounds: first, the officials doubted that she had escaped from prison through bribery; second, they were suspicious of what they regarded as discrepancies in her account. When she was in prison, she bribed a guard she recognized from her community. The immigration officials were suspicious that a guard would jeopardize his own security and position by accepting a bribe. However, we heard several similar cases in which someone used bribery to escape or to acquire a passport (Bohmer and Shuman 2008) . Cameroon was singled out as the most corrupt country in the world in 1999 (Terretta 2012) , but the officials still regarded Margaretta's story with suspiciondespite the fact that official 'country reports' also specifically describe corruption. In many asylum cases, we have observed that stories about bribery and other forms of corruption arouse suspicion for the officials (Bohmer and Shuman 2008, 92) . Bribery and other forms of corruption are in fact so common that this suspicion is itself strange; below we will return to this problem and consider the relationship between suspicion and tellability in the political asylum process.
Immigration officials use varied means to assess an individual's application. Relying on official 'country reports,' they consider the likelihood of particular kinds of violence occurring in particular places (Bohmer and Shuman 2008; Ramji-Nogales 2009) . Cameroon is a relatively stable African country and has good relations with the United States, so many Southern Cameroonian (English-speaking) applicants have faced difficulty gaining asylum. Using Goffman's terminology, we might say that the Cameroonian asylum applicants were potentially "disqualified," that is, stigmatized as potentially fraudulent, from the start. As Meredith Terretta, who served as an expert witness for Cameroonian cases, explains, Cameroonian asylum seekers have often been presumed to be economic migrants (and therefore fraudulent asylum seekers). Terretta argues that US asylum officials regard bribery and the rampant sale of false documents in Cameroon as an economic, rather than a political, problem. As an expert witness, Terretta attempted to correct the officials' assumptions. For example, she explained that a non-governmental building might serve as a prison (2012). Cameroonians were disqualified as asylum seekers because they were placed in a different (that is, economic) category, and they were stigmatized as fraudulent for making asylum claims at all.
Through dozens of examples, Goffman described the experience of exclusion and disqualification resulting from stigma. Goffman's examples identify individuals who are excluded from public participation because of a physical disability or sexual identity (1963, 81) . Political asylum seekers have experienced a violent form of stigma: discrimination that turned into persecution. Like any stigmatized group, political asylum seekers are disqualified from a category (citizen) that they and others perceive to be normal-and they are disqualified altogether from citizenship, not just from a particular aspect of it. As a Southern Cameroonian nursing student, Margaretta initially was disqualified only from receiving her degree. Later, when she protested, she was disqualified as a citizen. Goffman explains the response to stigma in part as a choice between disclosing the stigma (becoming visible) and concealing the stigma by means of 'passing' or remaining invisible. Many illegal immigrants, including political asylum applicants who have been refused asylum, choose invisibility. Political asylum is part of a politics of invisibility that is one way of managing the situation of being disqualified for citizenship. Drawing on Giorgio Agamben's work (1998), Luca Miggiano argues:
In such a situation [being denied], the migrant usually chooses to live as irregular in the country. In some sense she is accepted by the state just as homo sacer. She is similar to the Agambian encamped, yet different, since she is allowed to live as long as she remains "invisible." This is a relevant difference for our argument. She is, in fact, inside a border but still outside the boundary of citizenship. (2009, 12) As Miggiano points out, political asylum applicants differ from migrants who live under the radar illegally. Political asylum applicants are within the system but live provisionally, temporarily, awaiting a decision on their application. They have seen the destruction of their ordinary lives, but their status as applicants prevents them from resuming ordinary life. Most specifically, in the United States they cannot work during the first six months of their application process; in the United Kingdom they receive some benefits but cannot work until after they receive asylum.
As mentioned earlier, Margaretta was getting a degree at Buea University in Anglophone Cameroon when the Cameroonian government declared that degrees issued by her program were invalid and that she had to study in French. She and other students protested; she was detained several times and finally was going to be placed in a prison from which, as she said, no one ever left alive. After being raped in prison, she bribed a guard and escaped. She had been accepted for a Fulbright position in the United States, so she was able to go to the US embassy, retrieve her documentation, and come to the United States, where she applied for political asylum. When she left Cameroon and the authorities couldn't find her, they detained, tortured, and killed her brother. Margaretta's application was turned down twice on the grounds of inconsistencies in her story, but with the help of Carol Bohmer and another lawyer, she now has asylum. She can't return to Cameroon, and she says she stays alive only to avoid causing her mother more suffering.
Margaretta's story is not only about being multiply stigmatized as an Anglophone Cameroonian, as a protester, as a raped woman, and, in the United States, as a possible illegal alien rather than a heroic, venerated political prisoner. Her story is also about how catastrophe and violence have deprived her of being an ordinary person doing ordinary things like being a student, a daughter, and a citizen.
"We Can't Be Ourselves Anymore"
As the ground against which stigma is defined, the normal is often taken to be self-evident. To some extent, this is the case in the political asylum process, especially in assumptions that both asylum officials and asylum applicants make about presumed shared knowledge. However, 'normal' is far more often a negotiated category in the political asylum process. First, people fleeing persecution have experienced the loss of whatever was everyday normal life, and the political asylum process requires that they both reconstruct it and demonstrate the impossibility of returning to it. 7 The loss of ordinary life-for example, the means of earning a living-is not sufficient for an asylum claim, but it is part of the narrative. Second, the question of whether or not the persecution someone experienced merits asylum depends on an unstated and unexamined sense of what counts as 'normal' hardship as distinguished from atrocity (see Jackson 2002) . Political asylum applicants often describe humiliations, violence, and violation that the officials do not consider serious enough to warrant asylum. Third, asylum officials evaluate the situations in each country differently. What might be normal in one place is considered atrocious in another. As part of the process of assessing political asylum applications to determine whether they are legitimate or fraudulent and whether or not they meet the requirements for asylum, immigration officials rely on country reports that describe the political conditions in a particular country or region. Political asylum law requires that applicants prove a "well-founded fear" that would prevent return to their home countries. Applicants face many hurdles when attempting to prove well-founded fear (Bohmer and Shuman 2008) , but often the greatest challenge is created by the officials' assumptions about what is normal and what is extraordinary.
Margaretta's case for political asylum depended on her account of discrimination against English-speaking Cameroonians in general, a situation not well known in 2009, though it was documented at the time on websites.
8 The officials might have accepted her account of being stigmatized as an English-speaking Cameroonian, but stigma is not a sufficient condition for political asylum. Margaretta described the discovery that her nursing degree would not be accredited following the unification of French and Anglophone Cameroon:
So growing up as a child, I already knew that I was disadvantaged in a way. Because before they created the only English-speaking university, we had to go the French-speaking part of Cameroon for college and graduate study, and we had to study in French. So think about it. You study all your life in English. For elementary school to high school. And suddenly you're studying in French. When we went for our examinations, the French-speaking Cameroonians were laughing at us Anglophones. They were really making fun of us.
In this part of her narrative, told informally to Amy Shuman and not as part of her official political asylum narrative, Margaretta is describing being stigmatized as an English speaker. Stigma escalated to discrimination when the Francophone administrators discredited the nursing program in which Margaretta was enrolled. She describes learning about this: 9 When we got the information, and uh one of the professors . . . from the X tribe. We were in the ICU, and he came in. He said, "Oh sorry, you guys have just wasted your time. Your program is no longer accredited." . . . Irrespective of what you know. All that knowledge. Too bad. And so we were like, "Uh oh, something is not right here." So we spoke to some of our faculty members. And the faculty encouraged us. . . . So we organized a demonstration. We went on strike. We didn't go to class. . . . The whole university was very supportive. It just went to validate the fact that we can't be ourselves anymore.
Margaretta's last comment is important. The Anglophone Cameroonians could no longer be themselves. They no longer had the life of ordinary students but instead joined the Southern Cameroon National Council as activists. Margaretta noted, "So I decided to join the organization because I realized that I really had to do something. It wasn't going to get better. I needed to do something. So I joined and I started getting involved."
It was in her role as an activist, while demonstrating against the Anglophone administrative decision, that Margaretta was arrested. As a condition of her release, she was forced to sign a paper saying that she would not participate in future resistance efforts. She continued her activism; after her third arrest, she was going to be sent to a maximum-security prison. In her capacity as a nurse, before her life as an activist, she had rescued someone from that prison, and she knew that few prisoners left alive. She bribed a guard and was able to escape before being sent to the prison. The rationale for denying her asylum case was that she had not sufficiently demonstrated either her membership in the resistance group or her grounds for fearing return. Further, asylum officials asserted that a prison guard would be unlikely to jeopardize his own safety by helping her to escape. Many asylum seekers are denied with similar rationales (Bohmer and Shuman 2010) . In our research on political asylum, we have argued that asylum officials need to expand their concept of what is normal or at least understand that normal is always contingent on cultural, historical, and political factors. They need to recognize that in some situations, bribery is normal; in some situations, brothers are killed when their sisters can't be found. In his 1963 book Stigma, Goffman details the variety of possible associations people create in response to stigma. His discussion begins with the stigmatized individual who does not necessarily know, but might seek out, others who are similarly stigmatized. Still focusing on the individual, he provides examples of "the normals," people who find that their status is compromised by their association with stigmatized individuals. Many asylum seekers attempt to describe the persecution they experienced as a result of their association with stigmatized others. Although persecution and discrimination are entirely different in scale, Goffman's framework is useful for understanding the fundamental role that association plays in stigma, discrimination, and persecution.
Margaretta's story is in essence a story about realigned associations. As we noted, she contextualizes her personal account within the larger history of discrimination against Anglophone Cameroonians. When faced with the discreditation of her degree, she first joined with other protesting students and then joined the larger resistance movement. But her associations are not only with "fellow travelers" (to use Goffman's term, 1963, 85, 112-14) . Not all of her associations were designed to find shared understanding. One of her most important associations-one that led to her arrangement with the prison guard-was grounded in her social world apart from her life as a student and activist. She was acquainted with the guard through two connections: in her role as a nurse, she had treated his wife; she also knew one of his relatives. Before the discrimination against Anglophone nursing students, and before they protested this discrimination, Margaretta and the guard were affiliated in the medical domain. In the political domain, they were reconfigured as prisoner and guard, as enemies on different sides of a political struggle. Margaretta strategically called upon their earlier relationship when negotiating a means for her escape.
Political asylum officials are often suspicious of complex associations such as these, even though many applicants describe associations that Margaretta also experienced. She joined the resistance group not because of a longstanding ideological conviction, but rather because she felt compelled to act when faced with discrimination. In her search for help, she relied not only on people who shared her stigma and her experiences, but also on those one might call her enemies. Although the asylum officials seem to regard bribery as an association that compromises an asylum applicant's integrity, and thus her credibility (Terretta 2012), bribery can be more accurately understood in this case as part of an already compromised situation. Bribery involves irregular and contradictory associations that rely upon trust as well as power and corruption. Political asylum applicants report a variety of situations requiring bribery; these include, but are not limited to, using bribery to escape detention. People extract bribes for helping migrants and people fleeing persecution to obtain passports, visas, or other documents and for helping them cross borders and arrange transport. Bribery is endemic to situations of persecution, and yet it is a cause for suspicion among immigration officials, who themselves are sometimes accused of requesting or accepting bribes (New York Times 1999).
Bribery is an example of strange associations that become, in some situations, normal. Bribery draws on dimensions of the lost former ordinary life in which, for example, a man brings his wife to the doctor, and they become acquainted with a nurse. That ordinary association acquires different, but also ordinary (normal) significance when the man, as prison guard, can be bribed by the nurse, as prisoner. However, the asylum official accused of bribery is not part of a new normal, ordinary, association, but instead represents corruption, something that can threaten the ordinary. The failure of immigration officials to recognize that bribery is normal, rather than a sign of corruption that challenges the integrity of an asylum applicant, is not surprising when understood in terms of the larger context of the failure to recognize how violence becomes ordinary. As in domestic violence, unrecognizable associations (between people who are either supposed to be friends or supposed to be enemies) can render accounts of those associations untellable.
The Stigmatized Vernacular and Untellability
As Goffman observed, people with invisible stigmas often face a choice between disclosing or concealing their situation. Disclosure can invite exclusions and rejections; furthermore, in many cases people who reveal their stigma do not feel recognized or understood. Goffman does not fully address the conditions of recognition, and he limits his discussion to more obvious differences (visible scars, skin color, or disabilities) rather than addressing other conditions that bear on the complexities of invisibility and stigma.
People fleeing atrocity, for instance, are often in the impossible situation of having experienced humiliation and violence that they not only prefer not to recall, but that, in many cases, they cannot speak of. Margaretta was so threatened by the immigration officials in her first two hearings that she did not, and felt that she could not, tell them that she had been raped in prison. As part of the process of assisting Margaretta for her second hearing, Carol Bohmer called her weekly and asked her to tell her story. Carol worried that although these rehearsals were necessary for the success of the case, she was subjecting Margaretta to weekly emotional suffering. However, Margaretta described these sessions to Amy Shuman as "having the feeling of being someone somebody cares about."
Carol made a huge difference. A huge difference. She was very helpful. Carol-I can't tell you what she means to me. I can't even tell you. Every week, she made me have the feeling of being someone somebody cares about. She can never understand that.
Much has been written about the role of the witness who listens to trauma narratives (Caruth 1995; Culbertson 1995) . In an interview with Cathy Caruth, Robert Lifton says, One has had this experience, it has been over-whelming, the self has been shattered in some degree; the only way one can feel right or justified in reconstituting oneself and going on living with some vitality is to carry through one's responsibility to the dead. And it's carrying through that responsibility via one's witness, that survivor mission, that enables one to be an integrated human being once more. (1995, 138) Both authors of the present article, but Carol Bohmer especially, have served in the role of witness to asylum seekers' trauma narratives. As witnesses, we have helped asylum seekers tell stories that are multiply untellable: sometimes the narratives are about topics that are rarely if ever talked about in the tellers' native cultures; in some cases, the asylum process renders these stories untellable, such as when the translator's tribal or class status inhibits an applicant's full disclosure. The asylum process itself also creates conditions for what is tellable. One of the immigration officials in Well-Founded Fear (Robertson and Camerini 2000) describes the experience of hearing an applicant's story as "humbling," although the more typical relationship is that of interrogator and interrogated, with conversations filtered through a lens of suspicion. Put most simply, suspicion depends and creates categories of what counts as credible, and within that framework, narratives that do not fit the mold of the acceptable, expected script are not tellable. In Nancy Campbell's terms, "Technologies of suspicion are predicated upon a framework of trust; they are deployed within a 'system of takings-for-granted' that presupposes trust and thus makes distrust possible" (2004, 78) .
Goffman discusses the problem of the tellable within the larger contexts of public life and visibility. He points out that people conceal stigma to pass as 'normal,' and disclosure has a variety of motivations-for example, those who reveal stigma may desire to connect with someone who shares the stigma or to resist an imposed silence. For political asylum applicants (as for many others in Goffman's examples), passing means to be recognized as legitimate. The criteria are not only the interactional measures of whether someone has successfully convinced others that they are who they say they are, although this is a crucial factor (Bohmer and Shuman 2007) . In addition, for political asylum seekers, there are legal criteria that make a person unrecognizable to the state (Veena Das describes this condition as being "illegible" [2007, 162] ). Being able to speak, as difficult as that may be, is not sufficient for providing recognition.
Becoming Illegible and Unrecognizable: The Loss of the Ordinary
The ordinary and the normal are two of the conditions for recognition, and the loss of the ordinary-especially the violent and catastrophic interruption of any possibility of ordinary life-often makes people unrecognizable, underlining and intensifying the hegemony of normalcy. In Rejecting Refugees (Bohmer and Shuman 2008) we wrote mostly about the process of applying for political asylum, but the stories the asylum seekers told us were as much about their experience of loss of family and ordinary life as they were about the catastrophes they experienced. Part of the problem that Margaretta faced in her appeal for political asylum was that her story seemed both implausible and inconsistent to the immigration officials. Why would a prison guard accept a bribe and allow her to escape from a prison that no one left alive? If the authorities were after her, why did they kill her brother? How was she able to communicate with her mother? Why didn't she say in her first application that she had been raped? Margaretta was multiply stigmatized, already categorized according to hypervisibility categories as a fraud.
This much we could understand using a folkloristic understanding of repudiation and veneration. In principle, at least, nations offering asylum repudiate the violence people experience as a result of their political protest; they create the category of political asylum as a way of celebrating freedom and rescuing victims of persecution. However, to deserve this rescue, applicants are required (implicitly) to conform to the officials' expectations of what is normal. It's not normal to bribe your way out of jail, etc., etc. The asylum seekers' hypervisibility and the multiple stigmas they face can make them too unfamiliar, too unrecognizable to the immigration official's expected categoriesand falling outside those categories fosters suspicion.
Asylum seekers' invisibility is produced not only by a choice to 'pass' and thus remain invisible in order to escape detention and deportation; it is also effected by legal processes that further stigmatize applicants by casting suspicion on 'illegal' acts they might have done to escape. Experiencing persecution as a result of engaging in political protest may not in itself be sufficient to qualify for asylum, especially for applicants who are suspected of 'criminal' behavior. Thus, applicants are multiply stigmatized by what they did and by what happened to them: they have bribed authorities; they have been raped by authorities who misused their power; they have, in many cases, broken the law during the course of their escape. Concepts of ethnocentrism are useful for acknowledging different cultural normalcies-differences that are difficult enough to explain in themselves. But asylum applicants are in the additionally challenging position of accounting for culturally specific modes of corruption and persecution. Veena Das and Arthur Kleinman suggest that the challenge for ethnographers is to attend to what they call "the local pitch" of survivors' stories to understand how they reconfigure themselves in response to devastating loss. In their description of Todeschini's study of the Japanese women who survived the bomb, they write:
The account by Todeschini of women as storytellers relates how women counter by various means the social death imposed upon them: they resist both the stigma and the cardboard heroic roles assigned to them. Listening to them as an ethnographic stance requires that we not only assign importance to their stories for the lessons Hiroshima or Nagasaki has to teach us in relation to the grand projects of world history, but also tune our ears to hear the more local pitch at which such women speak to establish a new morality for themselves. (2001, 11) The "local pitch" is often unrecognizable to asylum officials. The appeal to pay attention to emic understandings is familiar to folklorists, but in this context, understanding is as much or more about the politics of visibility as it is about attending to local culture in context.
Although we began our research on political asylum a decade ago with the ethnographer's fundamental dependence on context as a means for clarifying discrepant interpretations, we have come to realize the limitations of attending to context as a means to address the problems in political asylum decisions. Initially, like others, we attempted to demonstrate how increased attention to different cultural contexts would prevent some of the mistakes immigration officials made so often in failing to recognize culturally different experiences of persecution and escape (Bohmer and Shuman 2008) . We now realize the impossibility of attending to context as a source of greater understanding when the problem is the stigmatized vernacular of invisibility, that is, the failure to recognize that normalcy (upon which discussions of context depend) is a construction that is not even available in catastrophic situations. Lauren Berlant describes how the politics of invisibility and the stigmatized vernacular intersect in her recounting of Anita Hill's testimony before the US Senate:
A member of a stigmatized population testifies reluctantly to a hostile public the muted and anxious history of her imperiled citizenship. Her witnessing turns into a scene of teaching and an act of heroic pedagogy, in which the subordinated person feels compelled to recognize the privileged ones, to believe in their capacity to learn and to change; to trust their desire to not be inhuman; and trust their innocence of the degree to which their obliviousness has supported a system of political subjugation. These moments are acts of strange intimacy between subaltern peoples and those who have benefited by their subordination. (1997, 222) Berlant's description could apply to the asylum seeker, though the stakes for the asylum seeker's "imperiled citizenship" involve deportation as well as hostility as possible outcomes, and the failure of the asylum seeker's testimony cannot be recuperated by lessons learned. However, Berlant is pointing to a profound connection between the loss of the ordinary and stigma. "Strange intimacy" describes the connection between those who are privileged to be normal and those who are excluded, an exclusion that perpetuates their connection, a connection that Goffman understood. In the context of exclusion, in which the familiar is so estranged as to be unattainable (because groups are deemed unqualified for it), making the familiar strange is a privilege.
Attention to cultural context fails because it is not possible to define the normal when the normal everyday has been completely replaced by routinized violence. In an essay on what he calls "cultural anesthesia," Allen Feldman describes a paper given by a Croatian folklorist about the "culture of fear in the former Yugoslavia." Feldman reports that the other ethnologists present at the conference were following Norbert Elias's argument "that modernization entails the progressive withdrawal of violence from everyday life in tandem with its increasing monopolization by the state" (Feldman 1994, 87) . "Due to their adherence to Elias's perspective," he continued, "[they] had difficulty conceptualizing political violence as a routinized element of everyday life" (88). The ordinary escapes our (the ethnographer's, the asylum official's) attention (and requires defamiliarization) not only because it is routine (as phenomenologists have so importantly observed), but also because in stigmatizing situations (or in states of emergency) the ordinary operates as exclusionary. On these occasions, the ordinary can exclude some people by disqualifying them altogether.
Stigma and Visibility
Stigma works by assigning, legitimating, and disputing value, and it depends on making things visible, hypervisible, or invisible and then naturalizing those positions. In her essay "Food, Form, and Visibility: Glub and the Aesthetics of Everyday Life," Mieke Bal (2005) provides a good example of stigma as a negotiation of visibilities. Her larger collaboration with filmmaker Shahram Entekhabi on "the aesthetics of migration" profiles immigrants from the Middle East who purchase sunflower seeds in storefront shops and eat them in public spaces. The film GLUB (Hearts), produced in 2003 and 2004 , contrasts these subjects with gallery-going Germans who buy their sunflower seeds in boutique seed shops in Berlin. What is most evident in sunflower-seed eating is the trash left behind, the hulls of seeds spit out on the streets and sometimes consumed by birds. Entekhabi created a montage of people buying the seeds, eating them, and discarding the shells, a visual image that blurs categories of nature and culture, high and low culture, immigrant and native German (Entekhabi and Bal 2005) .
The montage of people eating sunflower seeds in public creates a hypervisible image in which sunflower-seed-eating equals 'trash' equals 'immigrant creation of filth in public space'; by contrasting immigrants and Germans, the film also points to less visible social inequalities. Immigrants eat sunflower seeds in public and create trash; middle-class Germans eat sunflower seeds in public as a chic experience. The seeds themselves may be venerated as 'cuisine' even as the immigrants who imported the practice to Germany are repudiated. Mieke Bal describes the practice of eating seeds as a "hyper-visible phenomenon of the near-invisible" (2005, 59) . She argues that the more that particular immigrant cultural practices become "visible as such, the easier the host culture perceives them in terms of difference, a view that is always threatened [sic] to tip over into racism or its mitigated forms of exoticism and condescendence" (54).
Bal offers a model for understanding the role that visibility plays in the tipping point between difference and stigma. Gabriella Modan similarly explores the stigmatized vernacular in her discussion of filth in a multiethnic Washington, DC, neighborhood where she describes a "discursive type of spatial purification practice" (2007, 140) . Realestate ads and public policies redefine the multiethnic neighborhood that appreciates the diversity of ethnic restaurants, but not ethnic residents. In these discourses, some dimensions of ethnicity are venerated because they represent diversity, and other dimensions (the residents themselves) are repudiated as sources of filth.
Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett explains this paradox of simultaneous veneration and repudiation in terms of an asymmetry between the protection of universalized cultural assets and the protection of difference. In her essay "World Heritage and Cultural Economics," she notes "a paradoxical asymmetry between the diversity of those who produce cultural assets in the first place and the humanity to which those assets come to belong as world heritage" (2006, 162) . She describes diversity as working "centrifugally by generating cultural assets that can be universalized as world heritage, a process that expands the beneficiaries to encompass all of humanity." In contrast, "relativity works centripetally by invoking tolerance of difference to protect, insulate, and strengthen the capacities within individuals and communities to resist efforts to suppress their cultural practices, particularly in situations of religious and cultural conflict-a live and let live approach" (162).
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett defines heritage as "a mode of cultural production that gives the endangered or outmoded a second life as an exhibition of itself" (2006, 168) . But what makes a mode of cultural production appear to be outmoded? What are the conditions of a repudiation that permits future veneration? Kirshenblatt-Gimblett argues that when the endangered or outmoded, which she also refers to as "neglected communities and traditions," are threatened with loss (which we could see as a lack of visibility or audibility), they become reconfigured as hypervisible (2006, 9) . Importantly, the creation of the endangered and the creation of heritage are simultaneous; the stigma occurs with the hypervisibility.
These asymmetries produce and rely upon discourses of repudiation or stigma. The correction, the protection, or the recovery of culture proceeds quite differently depending on how a stigma is regarded. The relationship between veneration and repudiation is helpful for understanding the stigma that political asylum applicants face in their hearings with immigration officers. As a policy, political asylum depends on appreciation (not veneration) of the struggles people have faced and on the basic human right to be able to live without threat of torture or death due to political, religious, or cultural beliefs and/or practices. The policy venerates American ideals of freedom, and it can, by extension, at times celebrate the struggles of other peoples. This is complicated, of course, because not all asylum seekers share American values. Further compromising the ideal, many refugees who apply for political asylum are suspected (by officials and in media representations) of being fraudulent, of being economic migrants. And like economic migrants, asylum seekers are often repudiated as potentially (and illegitimately) taking resources from the host country (Westerman 1998) .
The asymmetry that produces the possibility of venerating cultural practices but repudiating people depends in part on relations among the visible, the hypervisible, and the invisible. For example, Charles Briggs and Clara Mantini-Briggs (2003) discuss how the visibility of cholera participates in other asymmetries, especially between more and less valued groups. Their study demonstrates how indigenous and creole groups are seen differently. On the face of it, the difference "simply defines a local cultural economy as separate but equal," but distinguishing the two categories is actually "a cover for asymmetrical relationships, where one group is constructed as the complete version and the other is a partial and defective copy" (2003, 251) .
Folklore and the Stigmatized Vernacular
The concept of the stigmatized vernacular represents a shift in the field of folklore and in the study of stigma, a shift from studying people at the margins to studying the conditions of marginalization. We note that the study of stigma in folklore is situated between discourses of veneration and repudiation. The folk, as conceptualized by nineteenthcentury antiquarians and collectors, were a stigmatized group: they were the not-quite-modern peasants who were identifiable by their ways of dressing, talking, or behaving, or by their traditional (that is, not-quite-modern) cultural practices. However, if the people were stigmatized for their poverty, ruralness, or gender, their practices were venerated, at least by antiquarians and folklorists, as worth remembering and preserving.
The recognition of discourses of veneration and repudiation in folkloristics is, in part, a consequence of folklorists' interests in performance and everyday life. In an assessment of how folklorists have addressed diversity, Stephen Stern comments that pluralism in the academy opened up folklorists' subject matter even as it encouraged broader participation by scholars: "Previously existing marginal groups took center stage, with women, ethnics, and the disabled now leading the call to become legitimate areas for folkloristic investigation" (1991, 23) . Later he adds,
The folk no longer are any group of people who share beliefs, but a menagerie of opinions and interpretations whose differences are more important than similarities and who form coalitions rather than communities. . . . In place of a group with soul or communitas there are people with competing interests and natures who, in trying to make sense of the world, collide and collude to make social life a fractious enterprise. Such a debasement of a once cherished folk has led to what Henry Glassie (1983) calls a crisis in morality, fueled by a focus on the trivial rather than on the socially relevant. (1991, 25) We suggest, however, that folklorists' insistence on "a once cherished folk" in fact perpetuates stigma.
Discourses of veneration, celebrations of the folk, even cultural relativism, are always intricately connected to discourses of repudiation. In a discussion of African American folklore studies, John Roberts critiques this veneration of the folk, arguing that such a stance obscures the complex diversity of African American cultural creativity (1993, 164) . Folklore is, to some degree, the study of the things people take pride in-and some cultural expressions are a response to stigma. Although one of the principles of ethnography is to study people on their own terms, not as repudiated, stigmatized, or discredited, ethnographers increasingly have been interested in the conditions of repudiation. Folklorists, in particular, are in a good position to understand discourses of repudiation and veneration in relation to each other and to the conditions that produce and sustain them. Folklorists can articulate how veneration, a seemingly positive gesture, can be a way of accepting people on our terms rather than expanding our concept of what counts as normal.
11 Identifying how veneration serves (or attempts to serve) as a corrective to repudiation is a good first step toward recognizing the folklorist's sometimes hidden agenda. In the form of empathy, veneration can be a dangerous corrective to stigma if it only serves the interests of the venerator (Shuman 2005) .
Political asylum occupies a complex position in discourses of empathy and repute. Founded as a humanitarian gesture to offer safe haven to people whose own governments will not protect them, the political asylum hearing process has become a gatekeeping mechanism with the primary goal of weeding out fraudulent (i.e., economic) migrants. The distinction is between the loss of a livelihood (the fraudulent economic migrant masquerading as a political refugee) and the loss of a life. Both losses, in Giorgio Agamben's terms, result in the "bare life," the person without citizenship. Referring to Hannah Arendt's proposal that the condition of the refugee is "the paradigm of a new historical consciousness," Agamben suggests that statelessness is a central, rather than exceptional, condition of subjectivity (1995, 114) . The refugee experiences exclusion from citizenship and other practices of ordinary life. This is a case of the ordinary (presumed to be normal) and the stigmatized mobilized in relation to, and defining, each other.
The stigmatized vernacular encompasses the practices of everyday, ordinary life that have been repudiated and that are sometimes legitimized, recognized, celebrated, or venerated. The dialectic of veneration and repudiation is part of a larger conversation about the dialectics of legitimation and contestation as interactive performances, whether in everyday life or in public policy.
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The Ohio State University Columbus Dartmouth College Hanover, New Hampshire Notes 1. Davis describes normalcy as a hegemonic imperative that requires enforcement. "This normalcy must constantly be enforced in public venues (like the novel), must always be creating and bolstering its image by processing, comparing, constructing, deconstructing images of normalcy and the abnormal" (1995, 44) .
2. Here we propose a connection between Goffman's discussion of alienation resulting from a "discrepancy . . . between an individual's virtual and actual identity . . . [that] has the effect of cutting him off from society and from himself so that he stands a discredited person facing an unaccepting world" (1963, 57) and Viktor Shklovsky's discussions of estrangement. As Svetlana Boym points out in an article about Shklovsky's work, estrangement is not the same as the Marxist concept of alienation (2005, 588) . We cannot review this complex concept here, but importantly, for our discussion, estrangement is not only a form of disengagement but also a source of the kind of awareness of difference (and then possible social change) that Goffman describes in Stigma.
3. One reviewer of this paper commented on the fact that we refer to other scholars' work rather than to the people with whom we have established firsthand relationships. We could quote asylum applicants we have known who discuss issues such as routinized violence. However, whenever possible, and contrary to ethnographic practice, we substitute even third-hand observations in an attempt to avoid unnecessarily exploiting the individuals we know. As ethnographers, we believe we provide an important perspective for understanding political asylum, and we suggest that our research on political asylum is useful for disciplinary thinking about the stigmatized vernacular. However, our primary purpose in working with asylum seekers has been to help them to understand and prepare for the hearing process, not to collect examples for scholarship. Some individuals, including Margaretta, asked us to make their stories public. 4. Our explanation is based on our assessments of refusal letters produced by UK officials and on our work with asylum seekers over the past decade. The refusal letters provide an explanation for a denial, but we do not actually know how officials make their decisions. See the film Well-Founded Fear (Robertson and Camerini 2000) for personal accounts of US officials.
5. For a more thorough discussion of the political asylum process, see Bohmer and Shuman 2008. 6. "The commitment of the international community is to ensure to all persons the enjoyment of human rights, including the rights to life; to freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; and to liberty and security of person. These and other rights are threatened when a refugee is returned to persecution or danger" (UN High Commissioner for Refugees 1997).
7. See Marilyn Ivy's discussion of trauma and the vanishing of the "imagined object of loss" (1995, 246 Robertson and Camerini 2000 and Ranger 2008 . These scholars and activists describe individual cases in depth, as we have, to document the complexity of officials' assessments of normalcy.
11. Katherine Borland (1991) attends to this issue in her discussion of her grandmother's refusal to be categorized as a feminist. Borland discusses the difficulty of representing people on their own terms.
12. This is one example of what John Brenkman calls for when he writes, "We must develop interpretive procedures which can account for the ways that the dialectic of legitimation and contestation internally structures expressive forms" (1987, 55) .
